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Abstract
We study the interaction between dispersed and sticky information by assuming
that ﬁrms receive private noisy signals about the state in an otherwise standard model
of price setting with sticky-information. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium
of the incomplete information game induced by the ﬁrms’ pricing decisions, and derive
the resulting Sticky-Dispersed Information (SDI) Phillips curve. The (equilibrium)
aggregate price level and the inﬂation rates we derive depend on all values they have
taken in the past. We perform several numerical simulations to evaluate how the
Sticky-Dispersed Phillips curve we derive respond to changes in the main parameters
of the model.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82, D83, E31
Keywords: Sticky information, dispersed information, Phillips curve
∗This article should not be reported as representing the views of the Banco Central do Brasil. The views




1I n t r o d u c t i o n 3
2T h e M o d e l 6
3 Equilibrium 8
3.1 Computing the Equilibrium . . ......................... 9
3.1.1 Prior Distribut i o n............................. 9
3.1.2 Linear Equilibrium . . . ......................... 1 0
3 . 1 . 3 U n i q u e n e s so fE q u i l i b r i u m :B e l i e f s ................... 1 1
4 Benchmarks for the SDI Phillips Curve 14
4.1 Benchmark 1: Complete-information Inﬂa t i o n ................. 1 5
4.2 Benchmark 2: Dispersed-information Inﬂa t i o n ................. 1 5
4.3 Benchmark 3: Sticky-information Inﬂa t i o n................... 1 6
4.4 Benchmark contribution to SDI inﬂa t i o n .................... 1 6
5I n ﬂation Behavior under SDI 17
5 . 1 C a l i b r a t i o n .................................... 1 7
5.2 Impact of complete information inﬂa t i o n .................... 1 8
5 . 3 I m p u l s eR e s p o n s eF u n c t i o n s........................... 1 9
5.4 Inﬂa t i o nV a r i a n c e................................. 2 1
6C o n c l u s i o n 2 3
7 Appendix 26
7.1 Prior Distributio n................................. 2 6
7.2 Higher Order Belie f s ............................... 2 8
21 Introduction
Over the last years, there has been renewed interest in the idea pioneered by Lucas (1972) and
Phelps (1968) that prices fail to respond quickly to nominal shocks due to the fact agents are
imperfectly informed about those shocks. As an example, Mankiw and Reis (2002) suggest
that, perhaps due to acquisition costs, information (rather than prices) is sticky, i.e., new
information is not immediately revealed to agents so that it diﬀuses slowly in the economy.
As a result, although prices are always changing, pricing decisions are not always based on
current information, and, consequently, do not respond instantaneously to nominal shocks.
There is also a large literature that assumes that agents have access to timely but het-
erogenous information about fundamentals. As a result, in the dispersed-information models
of Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and others, prices reﬂect the inter-
action among diﬀerently informed agents and their heterogenous beliefs about the state and
about what others know about the state.
In this paper, we study how individual ﬁrms set prices when information is both sticky
and dispersed, and analyze the resulting dynamics for aggregate prices and inﬂation rates.
In our model, the ﬁrms’ optimal price is a convex combination of the current state of the
economy and the aggregate price level. Moreover, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002), only a
fraction of ﬁrms update their information set at each period. Those who update receive two
sources of information: the ﬁrst piece is the value of all previous periods states, while the
second piece is a noisy, idiosyncratic, private signal about the current state of the economy.
Since noisy signals are idiosyncratic, the ﬁrms that update their information set will have
heterogenous information about the state (as in Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and
Pavan (20007)). Hence, in our model, heterogenous information disseminates slowly in the
economy.
As individual prices depend on the current state and the aggregate price level, ﬁrms that
u p d a t et h e i ri n f o r m a t i o ns e tm u s tn o to n l yf o r mb e l i e f sa b o u tt h ec u r r e n ts t a t eb u ta l s of o r m
beliefs about the other ﬁrms’ beliefs about current the state, and so on and so forth, so that
higher-order beliefs play a key role in our model. A ﬁrm’s belief about the state depends on
it is private signal. Hence, the pricing decisions by ﬁrms induce an incomplete information
game among them.
In our main result, we prove that there exists a unique equilibrium of such game. The
uniqueness of the equilibrium allows us to unequivocally speak about the sticky-dispersed-
information (henceforth, SDI) aggregate price level and Phillips curve. The SDI aggregate
3price level we derive depends on all the prices ﬁrms have set in the past. This is so for two
reasons. First, there are ﬁrms in the economy for which the information set has been last
u p d a t e di nt h ef a rp a s t .T h i si sadirect eﬀect of sticky information. Second, ﬁrms that have
just received new information will behave, at least partly, as if they were backward-looking.
This happens because of an strategic eﬀect: their optimal relative price depends on how they
believe all other ﬁrms (including those that have outdated information sets) in the economy
are setting prices
From aggregate prices, we are able to derive the SDI Phillips curve. Since current ag-
gregate prices depend on all prices set by ﬁrms in the past, the current inﬂation rate will
also depend on inﬂation rates that prevailed in the past. Therefore, in spite of the fact that
ﬁrms are forward looking in our model, the Phillips curve that results from their interaction
displays a non-trivial dependence on inﬂation rates that prevailed in the past. This is an
implication of the stickiness of information in our model and was already present in Mankiw
and Reis (2002). In our model, however, in addition to being sticky, information is also noisy
and dispersed. The fact that information is noisy leads a ﬁrm that has its information set
updated in t to ﬁnd it optimal to place positive weight on the states from periods t − j,
j>0, to predict the state in period t. Hence, in comparison to an economy à la Mankiw
and Reis (2002), the adjustment of prices to shocks will be slower in an economy with noisy
information. Through the complementarities in price setting, the dispersion of information
magniﬁes such eﬀect.
Our model nests as special cases the complete information model, the dispersed informa-
tion model and the sticky information model. To better understand the roles played by infor-
mation stickiness and dispersed information, we decompose our SDI Phillips curve into three
benchmark inﬂation rates that can be obtained as limiting cases of our model: (i) complete-
information inﬂation, (ii) dispersed-information inﬂation, and (iii) sticky-information inﬂa-
tion.
We study the individual contribution to the SDI Phillips curve of each of the main
parameters of our model: (i) Degree of strategic complementarity, (ii) Degree of informational
stickiness, (iii) Public information precision, and (iv) Private information precision. First,
we analyze the impact of current and past complete-information inﬂation rates on current
SDI inﬂation. Second, we consider the inﬂation response to monetary shocks. Finally, we
compare the variance of SDI inﬂation with the variances of complete-information inﬂation,
dispersed-information inﬂation, and sticky-information inﬂation.
In addition to the eﬀects discussed above, the introduction of dispersed information in
4an otherwise standard sticky-information model sheds light on two diﬀerent issues. First,
dispersion in an sticky- information setting generates price and inﬂation inertia irrespective of
assumptions regarding the ﬁrms’ capacity to predict equilibrium outcomes. Indeed, although
they may not have their information sets up to date, the ﬁrms in our model correctly predict
the equilibrium behavior of their opponents. In spite of correctly predicting the strategies
(i.e., contingent plans) adopted by the opponents in equilibrium, a ﬁrm cannot infer what is
the actual price set by them (i.e., the action taken), since it does not observe its opponents’
private signals. Hence, a ﬁrm that has not updated its information set cannot infer the
current state from the behavior of its opponents. This is in contrast to Mankiw and Reis
(2002) who, at least for the main numerical experiment presented in their paper, obtain price
inertia by (implicitly) assuming that agents cannot condition on equilibrium behavior from
the opponents. In fact, in such experiment, there is a (single) nominal shock that only a
fraction of the ﬁrms observe. Trivially, the prices set by those ﬁrms (as well as aggregate
prices) will reﬂect such change in the fundamental. Hence, ﬁrms that haven’t observed the
shock but can predict the equilibrium behavior of the opponents will be able to infer the
fundamental from such behavior.1 It follows that all ﬁrms should adjust prices in response
to a shock.
The second, and more important, issue relates to policy. In a world in which information
is dispersed, the optimal communication policy for a benevolent central banker who has
(imperfect) information about the states is far from trivial. On the one hand, any information
disclosed by the central banker about the state will have the beneﬁt of allowing the agents
to count on an additional piece of information about the state when deciding on their prices.
This beneﬁt is particularly relevant when information is sticky for a fraction of ﬁrms is setting
prices based on outdated information about the current state. On the other hand, since the
information disclosed by the central banker is a public signal, agents will place too much
weight on any information disclosed by the central banker as this is a public signal (e.g.,
Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007). We believe the model we put forth in
this paper is a suitable framework to study optimal communication policy by central banks
when information is heterogenous and sticky.
Related Literature. This work follows a large number of papers that sheds new light
into the tradition that dates back to Phelps (1968) and Lucas (1972) of considering the eﬀects
of imperfect information on price-setting decisions. Mankiw and Reis (2009) provide the most
1The argument here is similar to the one in Rational Expectations Equilibrium models à la Grosmann
(1981).
5recent survey of aggregate supply under imperfect information, whereas Veldkamp (2009)
covers a myriad of topics related to informational asymmetries and information acquisition
in macroeconomics and ﬁnance. Our paper connects to this broad literature through two
speciﬁc strands. In our model, (i) information in our model is sticky, as in Mankiw and Reis
(2002) and others, and (ii) following Woodford (2002) and Morris and Shin (2002), among
others, information is dispersed.
The papers that are the closest to ours are Mankiw and Reis (2009) and Angeletos and
La’O (2009). In addition to surveying the most recent literature on the impact of informa-
tional frictions on pricing decisions, Mankiw and Reis (2009) compare a partial (dispersed)
information model with a delayed (sticky) information model, and derive their common
implications.2 In turn, Angeletos and La’O (2009) introduce dispersed information (and ex-
plicitly discuss the role of higher order beliefs) in an otherwise standard setting with sticky
prices àl aCalvo (1983). We depart from Mankiw and Reis (2009) by combining in a sin-
gle model both dispersed information and informational stickiness, highlighting their joint
eﬀects on aggregate prices and inﬂation rates. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
ﬁrst to oﬀer an integrated approach to study the interaction of dispersion and stickiness on
pricing decisions. By focusing on informational stickiness (rather than price stickiness), we
complement the analysis of Angeletos and La’O (2009).
Organization. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the set-up of the model
is described. In section 3, we derive the unique equilibrium of the pricing game played
by the ﬁrms, and derive the implied aggregate prices and inﬂation rates. In section 4,
we compare our SDI Phillips curve with three benchmarks: the complete information, the
sticky-information and the dispersed information Phillips curves. Section 5 calibrates our
SDI Phillips curve for diﬀerent values of the main parameters of the model. Section 6
draws the concluding remarks. All derivations that are not in the text can be found in the
Appendix.
2 The Model
The model is a variation of Mankiw and Reis’ (2002) sticky information model.3 T h e r ei sa
continuum of ﬁrms, indexed by i ∈ [0,1], that set prices at every period t ∈ {1,2,...}.
2The theories of "rational inattention" proposed by Sims (2003, 2009) and "inattentiveness" proposed by
Reis (2006a, 2006b), have been used to justify models of dispersed information and sticky information.
3Subsequent reﬁnements of the sticky information models can be found in Mankiw and Reis (2009, 2007,
2006) and Reis (2009, 2006a, 2006b).
6Although prices can be re-set at no cost at each period, information regarding the state
of the economy is made available to the ﬁrms infrequently. At period t, only a fraction λ
of ﬁrms is selected to update their information sets about the current state. For simplicity,
the probability of being selected to adjust information sets is the same across ﬁrms and
independent of history.
We depart from a standard sticky-information model by allowing information to be het-
erogeneous and dispersed:aﬁrm that updates its information set receives public information
regarding the past states of the economy as well as a private signal about the current state.
Pricing Decisions:
Under complete information, any given ﬁrm z ∈ [0,1] set its (log-linear) price pt (z) equal




t ≡ rPt +( 1− r)θt, (1)
where Pt ≡
R 1
0 pt (z)dz is the aggregate price level, and θt is the nominal aggregate demand,
the current state of the economy. This pricing rule is standard, and, although we don’t
do it explicitly, can be derived from a ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem in a model of
monopolistic competition à la Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
Information:
The state θt follows a random walk
θt = θt−1 +  t, (2)
with  t ∼ N (0,α −1).
If ﬁrm z ∈ [0,1] is selected to update its information set in period t, it observes all
previous periods realizations of the state, {θt−j,j≥ 1}. Moreover, it obtains a noisy private
signal about the current state. Denoting such signal by xt (z), we follow the literature and
assume:
xt (z)=θt + ξt (z), (3)




, β is the precision of xt (z), and the error term ξt (z) is independent
of  t for all z,t.




at period t, the information set of a ﬁrm z that was selected to update its information j
7periods ago is
It−j (z)={xt−j (z),Θt−j−1}. (5)
3 Equilibrium
Using (1), the best response for a ﬁrm z that was selected to update its information j
periods ago — and, therefore, has It−j (z) as its information set — is its forecast of p∗
t,g i v e n
t h ea v a i l a b l ei n f o r m a t i o nIt−j (z) and the equilibrium behavior of its opponents:
pj,t (z)=E [p
∗
t | It−j (z),p −j,t (.)]. (6)
Denoting by Λt−j the set of ﬁr m st h a tl a s tu p d a t e di t si n f o r m a t i o ns e ta tp e r i o dt − j,











t | It−j (z),p −j,t (.)]dz.
Since the optimal price p∗
t is a convex combination of the state, θt, and the aggregate
price level, ﬁrm z needs to forecast the state of the economy and the pricing behavior of the
other ﬁrms in the economy. The pricing behavior of each of these ﬁrms, in turn, depends
on their own forecast of the other ﬁrms’ aggregate behavior. It follows that ﬁrm z must not
only forecast the state of the economy but also, to predict the behavior of the other ﬁrms in
the economy, must make forecasts of these ﬁrms’ forecasts about the state, forecasts about
the forecasts of these ﬁrms forecasts about the state, and so on and so forth. In other words,
higher order beliefs will play a key role in the derivation of an equilibrium in our model.










£ ¯ Ek−1 [θt] | It−j (z)
¤
dz, k ≥ 1
(8)
we have:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the aggregate price level is





83.1 Computing the Equilibrium
In this section, we derive the unique equilibrium of the pricing game played by the ﬁrms.
Following Morris and Shin (2002), we do this in two steps. We ﬁrst derive an equilibrium
for which the aggregate price level is a linear function of fundamentals. We then establish,
using Proposition 1, that this linear equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of our game.
3.1.1 Prior Distribution
In the Appendix, we show that, given the distribution of the private signals and the process
{θt} implied by (2), a ﬁrm z that updated its information set in period t − j makes use of
the variables xt−j (z)=θt−j + ξt−j (z) and θt−j−1 = θt−j −  t−j, to form the following belief
about the current state θt−j:
θt−j | It−j (z) ∼ N
¡








Hence, a ﬁrm that updated its information set in t − j expects the current state to be a
convex combination of the private signal xt−j (z) and a (semi) public signal θt−j−1 —t h eo n l y
relevant piece of information that comes from learning all previous states {θt−j−k}k≥1.4 The
relative weights given to xt−j (z) and θt−j−1 when the ﬁrm computes the expected value of
state θt−j depend on the precision of such signals.
Using (2), one has that, for m ≤ j,
θt−m = θt−j +
Pj−m−1
k=0  t−m−k. (12)
Thus, the expectation of a ﬁrm z that last updated its information set at t−j about θ is
E [θt−m | It−j (z)] =
(
E [θt−j | It−j (z)] = (1 − δ)xt−j (z)+δθt−j−1 : m ≤ j
θt−m : m>j
. (13)
In words, a ﬁrm that last updated its information set in period t −j e x p e c t st h a ta l lf u t u r e
values of the fundamental θ will be the same as the expected value of the fundamental at the
4θt−j−1 is the only piece of information in Θt−j = {θt−j−k}
∞
k=1 the ﬁrm needs to use because the state’s
p r o c e s si sM a r k o v i a n .
9period t − j. Moreover, since at the moment it adjusts its information set the ﬁrm observes
all previous states, the ﬁrm will know for sure the value of θt−m for m>j .
3.1.2 Linear Equilibrium
To derive the linear equilibrium, we adopt a standard guess and verify approach. We assume
that the (equilibrium) aggregate price level is linear and then show that the implied best
responses for the individual ﬁrms indeed lead to linear aggregate prices.




for some constants cj,j≥ 0.
In such case, the optimal price for a ﬁrm that last updated information at t − m is
pt = E [(1 − r)θt + rPt | It−m]
=( 1 − r)E [θt | It−m]+r
P∞
j=0 cjE [θt−j | It−m]
=( 1 − r)E [θt | It−m]+r
Pm
j=0 cjE [θt−j | It−m]+r
P∞
j=m+1 cjE [θt−j | It−m]
=[ 1 − r(1 − Cm)][(1 − δ)xt−m + δθt−m−1]+r
P∞
j=m+1 cjθt−j

















m=0 (1 − λ)
m
n






m=0 (1 − λ)
m {[1 − r(1 − Cm)][(1 − δ)θt−m + δθt−m−1]}
+r
P∞
m=0 cm[1 − (1 − λ)
m]θt−m.
Note that the above equality can be re-written as
10(1 − r)Pt = λ(1 − δ)
P∞
m=0 (1 − λ)
m[1 − r(1 − Cm)]θt−m
+λδ
P∞
m=0 (1 − λ)
m [1 − r(1 − Cm)]θt−m−1
−r
P∞
m=0 (1 − λ)
m cmθt−m,
so that the implied aggregate price will be linear in the values of the fundamental, as assumed
in (14).






1−rλ(1−δ) if k =0
λ(1−r)φ(1−λ)k−1
[1−r[1−φ(1−λ)k−1]][1−r[1−φ(1−λ)k]] if k ≥ 1,
(15)
where




j=0 cj =1 .
We have then shown:
Proposition 2 (Linear Equilibrium) There exists an equilibrium in which the aggregate
price level in period t, Pt, are linear in the states {θt−j}
∞
j=0 .
3.1.3 Uniqueness of Equilibrium: Beliefs
As shown in Proposition (1), an alternative way to describe the aggregate price level in
period t is through a weighed average of all (average) higher order beliefs about the state
θt. In this section, we derive such beliefs and establish that the implied aggregate price level
will be identical to the one derived in Proposition (2). This will establish that the linear
equilibrium is unique.
First Order Beliefs:




j=0 (1 − λ)
j [(1 − δ)θt−j + δθt−j−1]. (16)
Higher Order Beliefs:
11In the Appendix, we use (16) and the recursion (8) to derive the following useful result:




m=0 (1 − λ)
m[κm,kθt−m + δm,kθt−m−1], (17)























1 − (1 − λ)
m+1¤






1 − (1 − λ)
m+1¤
− [1 − (1 − λ)
m]
¤£




and the initial weights are (κ1,k,δ1,k) ≡ (1 − δ,δ).
Plugging (17) into the expression for the aggregate price level Pt, (9), we get, after a few
manipulations, the following expression for the aggregate price level:







m=0 Km[(1 − ∆m)θt−m + ∆mθt−m−1],
where the weights Km and ∆m are
Km ≡
(1 − r)λ(1 − λ)
m





1 − (1 − λ)
m+1¤¢,
∆m ≡






1 − (1 − λ)
m+1¤
+ δ[1 − (1 − λ)
m]
¤.
Comparing the coeﬃcients above with the {cj}
∞
j=0 deﬁn e di n( 1 5 ) ,f o r
c0 with K0 (1 − ∆0),
ck with Km−1∆m−1 + Km(1 − ∆m),m ≥ 1,
one sees that the aggregate price level implied by (18) is exactly the same as the one derived
in Proposition (2).
12Having shown that the equilibrium is unique, we can unequivocally speak about the
Phillips curve of our economy. Denoting the inﬂation rate by πt, by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences
of equation (18), we can write our sticky-dispersed-information Phillips curve as
πt =
P∞
m=0 Km [(1 − ∆m)(θt−m − θt−m−1)+∆m(θt−m−1 − θt−m−2)]. (19)
We summarize all the discussion above in the following result:
Proposition 3 In an economy in which information is sticky and dispersed, and the state
follows (2), there is a unique equilibrium in the pricing game played by the ﬁrms. In such
equilibrium, the aggregate price level is given by
Pt =
P∞
m=0 Km[(1 − ∆m)θt−m + ∆mθt−m−1], (20)
and the SDI Phillips curve is given by
πt =
P∞
m=0 Km [(1 − ∆m)(θt−m − θt−m−1)+∆m(θt−m−1 − θt−m−2)], (21)
where
Km ≡
(1 − r)λ(1 − λ)
m





1 − (1 − λ)
m+1¤¢, (22)
∆m ≡






1 − (1 − λ)
m+1¤
+ δ[1 − (1 − λ)
m]
¤. (23)
Note that the current aggregate price level Pt depends on all the prices ﬁrms have set
in the past. This is so for two reasons. First, there are ﬁrms in the economy for which
the information set has been last updated in the far past. This is a direct eﬀect of sticky
information. Second, even ﬁrms that have just adjusted their information set will be, at
least partly, backward-looking. This happens because of an strategic eﬀect: their optimal
relative price depends on how they believe all other ﬁrms (including those that have outdated
information sets) in the economy are setting prices. The direct and strategic eﬀects of sticky
information are captured by the terms Km.
It is immediate that, since current aggregate prices depend on all prices set by ﬁrms in
the past, the current inﬂation rate will also depend on inﬂation rates that prevailed in the
past. Therefore, in spite of the fact that ﬁrms are forward looking in our model, the Phillips
curve that results from their interaction displays a non-trivial dependence on inﬂation rates
13that prevailed in the past. This is an implication of the stickiness of information in our
model and was already present in Mankiw and Reis (2002).
In our model, however, on top of being sticky, information is also disperse.T h ee ﬀect of
dispersion is captured by the positive weight given to the state in period θt−m−1 by a ﬁrm
that has its information set updated in t − m. As the private signal the ﬁrm observes is
noisy, it is always optimal to place some weight on past states to forecast the current state.
Hence, in comparison to an economy à la Mankiw and Reis (2002), the adjustment of prices
to shocks will be slower in an economy with disperse information.
Also, and perhaps more importantly, the introduction of dispersion in an sticky infor-
mation model allows us to generate price and inﬂation inertia irrespective of assumptions
regarding the ﬁrms’ capacity to predict equilibrium outcomes. Indeed, although they may
not have their information sets up to date, the ﬁrms in our model correctly predict the
equilibrium behavior of their opponents. In spite of correctly predicting the strategies (i.e.,
contingent plans) adopted by the opponents in equilibrium, a ﬁrm cannot infer what is the
actual price set by them (i.e., the action taken), since it cannot observe its opponents’ private
signals. Hence, a ﬁrm that hasn’t updated its information set cannot infer the current state
from the behavior of its opponents.
This is in contrast to Mankiw and Reis (2002) who, in order to obtain price and infor-
mation inertia in a model with sticky but non-dispersed information, (implicitly) assume
that agents cannot condition on equilibrium behavior from the opponents. In fact, in their
main experiment, there is a (single) nominal shock that only a fraction of the ﬁrms observe.
Trivially, the prices set by those ﬁrms (as well as aggregate prices) will reﬂect such change
in the fundamental. Hence, a ﬁrm that hasn’t observed the shock but can predict the equi-
librium behavior of the opponents will be able to infer the fundamental from such behavior.5
It follows that all ﬁrms will adjust prices in response.
4 Benchmarks for the SDI Phillips Curve
Our model nests the dispersed information model (λ =1 )a n dt h es t i c k yi n f o r m a t i o nm o d e l
(β
−1 → 0) as special cases. In order to understand the properties of the SDI Phillips curve,
in what follows, we compare it to those two benchmarks as well as to the Phillips curve
implied by the complete information case.
5The argument here is similar to the one in Rational Expectations Equilibrium models à la Grosmann
(1981).
144.1 Benchmark 1: Complete-information Inﬂation
Under complete information, the price of any ﬁrm z is
pt (z)=p
∗
t ≡ rPt +( 1− r)θt.
Since ﬁrms are identical, they all set the same price. As a result
Pt = rPt +( 1− r)θt ⇒ Pt = θt.
Hence, if θ is common knowledge, the equilibrium entails an inﬂation rate πC,t —t h a tw e
call the complete-information inﬂation —t h a ti se q u a lt ot h ec h a n g eo fs t a t e s :
πC,t = θt − θt−1 (24)
4.2 Benchmark 2: Dispersed-information Inﬂation
If stickiness vanishes (λ =1 ) , our results converge to the ones obtained by Morris and Shin
(2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007). Denoting the inﬂation rate for the economy without
stickiness by πD,t (the dispersed information inﬂation), we have:
πD,t =( 1− ∆)πC,t + ∆πC,t−1, (25)
so that the inﬂation rate in period t is a convex combination of the complete information
inﬂations of period t and t−1, with the weight on period t−1 complete information inﬂation
given by
∆ = c1 ≡
δ
1 − r(1 − δ)
, (26)
1 − ∆ = c0,a n dck =0 , ∀ k>1.6
When compared to the full information case, the inﬂation rate that prevails with dispersed
information displays more inertia. Moreover, note that
E [πD,t | It (z)] = (1 − ∆)E [πC,t | It (z)] + ∆πC,t−1.
6Alternatively, as in Morris and Shin (2002), we can say that inﬂation in t is a convex combination of the
"state/fundamental", πC,t, and the "public signal", πC,t−1.
15Hence, when information is dispersed, the forecast error
πD,t − E [πD,t | It (z)] = (1 − ∆)[πC,t − E [πC,t | It (z)]]
is proportional to the forecast error of the complete information inﬂation πC,t.
4.3 Benchmark 3: Sticky-information Inﬂation
The other polar case occurs when information is sticky but not dispersed (δ =0 ) .I ns u c h
case, the Phillips curve we obtain resembles the one in Mankiw and Reis (2002). Denoting




where inﬂation is also a function of current and past complete-information inﬂation, but with
the weights Km in (22) replacing the coeﬃcients cm deﬁned in (15). Note that, for m =0
c0 ≡
(1 − r)λ(1 − δ)










[1 − rλ(1 − δ)]
2 < 0.
4.4 Benchmark contribution to SDI inﬂation
We can rewrite our SDI Phillips curve as a combination of the inﬂation rates that prevail
under the three benchmarks cases discussed above. First, note that the SDI inﬂation π is
a function of complete information inﬂations πC of current and previous periods. Indeed,






m=0 Km[(1 − ∆m)πC,t−m + ∆mπC,t−m−1].
Using (21) and (27), we can also relate the SDI inﬂation to the sticky-information inﬂation
πS as follows:
πt = πS,t −
P∞
m=0 Km∆m(πC,t−m − πC,t−m−1).
16Finally, if we combine this last equation with (25), we obtain a decomposition of SDI inﬂation
that includes all the proposed benchmarks







[πD,t−m − πC,t−m]. (29)
Thus, compared to the case in which information is sticky, inﬂation under sticky and dis-
persed information will be higher if, and only if, the dispersed information inﬂation, πD,t−m,
is on "average" higher than the complete information inﬂation πC,t−m.
5I n ﬂation Behavior under SDI
We now examine how the SDI Phillips curve behaves in response to changes in the main
p a r a m e t e r so ft h em o d e l . M a k i n gu s eo ft h ef a c tt h a tw ec a nw r i t et h eS D Ii n ﬂation as a
weighted average of all past complete information inﬂation rates, we start, in Figure 1, by
analyzing the impact of period t − k complete information inﬂation πC,t−k on SDI current
inﬂation πt. After that, in Figure 2, we consider the inﬂation response to monetary shocks.
Finally, in Figure 3, we consider the behavior of SDI’s inﬂation variance as well as the
variances of the three benchmarks considered in Section 4: complete-information inﬂation,
dispersed-information inﬂation, and sticky-information inﬂation.
To isolate eﬀects, we perform each of the above exercises for diﬀerent values of the
key parameters of the model as listed in Table 1 — (a) Strategic complementarity r,( b )
Information stickiness λ, (c) Public information precision α, and (d) Private information
precision β.
5.1 Calibration
The model’s structural parameters are r, λα ,a n dβ. The baseline values we use for r and λ
(see Table 1) are standard and based on Mankiw and Reis (2002). A value of λ =0 .25 can
be interpreted as implying that, on average, ﬁrms adjust their information set (and therefore
their prices) once a year. This is compatible with the most recent microeconomic evidence
on price-setting.7 The higher the value of r, the more important becomes the aggregate price
level (and therefore the strategic interaction component) for (of) the ﬁrms’s optimal price.
We set α = β =0 .5 as our benchmark value to keep the baseline calibration as neutral as
7See, for example, Klenow and Malin (2009).
17Parameter Description Range Benchmark
Value
r Degree of strategic complementarity [0,1] 0.90
λ Degree of informational stickiness [0,1] 0.25
α Public information precision [0,1] 0.50
β Private information precision [0,1] 0.50
Table 1: Baseline calibration
possible regarding the importance of public versus private information precision.
To better understand the impact of each individual parameter on the SDI Phillips curve,
in what follows, we always keep three of the four key parameters ﬁxed at their benchmark
values and vary the fourth one.
5.2 Impact of complete information inﬂation
We ﬁrst consider the impact of period t − k complete information inﬂation πC,t−k on the
current SDI inﬂation πt. Using equation (28), one can readily see that such impact is fully
captured by the coeﬃcients c0
js in Equation (15). We plot the results in Figure 1, where
each panel shows the eﬀect of changes in one of the four parameters of the model.
Consider Panel (a) of Figure 1. The weight on the current complete information inﬂation
is higher the lower the degree of strategic complementarity, r. As the degree of strategic
complementarity rises, the incentive for ﬁrms to align prices increases. As a result, even
informed ﬁrms will attach a higher weight on past information. This leads to a higher
impact of past complete information on current SDI inﬂation.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 captures the role of informational stickiness on the impact of past
full information inﬂation rates on current SDI inﬂation. It can be seen that higher values of λ
(i.e., smaller degrees of information stickiness) are related to lower weights on past complete
information inﬂation. As the degree of information stickiness increases, however, the share
of SDI inﬂation that comes from the past is higher, since ﬁr m sh a v ei n c e n t i v e st oa l i g np r i c e s
and, the lower λ, the larger the faction of price setters that are stuck with past information
about the state.
The impact of information dispersion on SDI inﬂation is shown in Panels (c) and (d)
of Figure 1. Firms attach more weight on a given piece of information the more precise
it is. Consider the case in which public information becomes more precise (α increases)
18Figure 1: Coeﬃcients c0
js for diﬀerent values of the parameters (r,λ,α,β).
and/or private information becomes less precise (β decreases). In such case, δ ≡ α/(α + β)
increases, and ﬁrms attach more weight to the past since, the larger δ, the more (relatively
to their private information) the ﬁrms can be conﬁdent about past fundamentals being a
good source of information about the current fundamental.
5.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of current SDI inﬂation, πt, to a shock in the funda-
mental process { t} in (2).
From Panel (a) of Figure 2, we observe that, as r increases, inﬂation becomes more
inertial. When r =0 ,t h eﬁrms’ desired prices respond only to the value of the fundamental,
θ.I ns u c hc a s e ,i n ﬂation responds quickly to the shock. By contrast, when 0 <r<1, ﬁrms
also care about the overall price level and, therefore, need to consider what information
19Figure 2: Responses of πt to a shock in the fundametal process  t for diﬀerent values of
(r, λ, α, β).
other ﬁrms have. In the SDI model, as well as in the sticky-information model, this strategic
complementarity in prices is a source of inﬂation inertia.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 considers the impact of information stickiness on inﬂation dynamics.
For higher values of λ (smaller degree of information stickiness), inﬂation not only responds
more quickly to a shock in the fundamental but also returns to its pre-shock levels at a faster
rate.
Finally, Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2 show the impact of information dispersion on SDI
inﬂation. Once again, recall that δ ≡ α/(α + β) rises when public information becomes
more precise and/or private information becomes less precise. Higher values for δ imply that
previous values of θ are relatively more precise signals of the state than the ﬁrm’s private
information. As a result, for large δ, even ﬁr m st h a tu p d a t et h e i ri n f o r m a t i o ns e t sat the
moment of the shock respond less to such new piece of information.
20Also, for a given δ, an additional strategic eﬀect leads the ﬁr m st op l a c eal a r g e rw e i g h t
on past information about the state. Indeed, a ﬁrm that wishes to align its price to other
ﬁrms’ prices relies more heavily on public information because it is a better predictor of other
ﬁrms’ prices than private information. This eﬀect has been already pointed out by authors
such as Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007), and others in related contexts.
5.4 Inﬂation Variance



















is a function of (r,λ), as can be seen by the deﬁnition of Kj in (22).
Finally, from equation (28), we obtain the variance of SDI inﬂation
Va r[πt]=ΩVa r[πC,t],







js are deﬁned in (15).
Notice that the variance of the SDI inﬂation, Va r[πt], is proportional to the variance of
complete information inﬂation, Va r[πC,t]. A bit more surprising is the fact that the informa-
tional frictions we consider in the model reduce the variance of inﬂa t i o nw h e nc o m p a r e dt o
21Figure 3: Variances of SDI inﬂation πt, complete-information inﬂation πC,t,d i s p e r s e d -
information inﬂation πD,t, and sticky-information inﬂation πS,t as a function of
(r, λ, α, β).
t h ec o m p l e t ei n f o r m a t i o nb e n c h m a r k .T h er e a s o ni sa sf o l l o w s .A sd i s c u s s e dt h r o u g h o u tt h e
paper, the combination of sticky and dispersed information with strategic interdependence
in price setting leads to inﬂationary inertia, which, in turn, reduces, the variance of inﬂation
under SDI.
Figure 3 plots Va r[πt] as well as Va r[πC,t], Va r[πD,t],a n dVa r[πS,t] as a function of
(r,λ,α,β).8
As can be seen from Figure 3, the variances of complete-information inﬂation Va r[πC,t]
and dispersed-information inﬂation Va r[πD,t] are always higher than SDI inﬂation’s, Va r[πt],
and sticky-information inﬂation’s, Va r[πS,t]. Notice, moreover, that Va r[πt] and Va r[πS,t]
have a similar behavior and only seem to be aﬀected by the degree of informational stickiness
8We plot Ω¯ k ≡
P¯ k
j=0 c2
j rather than Ω for computational reasons.
22λ. Both variances, Va r[π] and Va r[πS,t], increase with the degree of information stickiness.
As the signals become more precise, more similar are the information sets of the ﬁrms.
As a result, dispersed-information inﬂation Va r[πD,t] decreases considerably as information
precision α and β increase. Va r[πD,t] is also aﬀected by the degree os strategic complemen-
tarity r. As r increases, more weight is given by a ﬁrm to its forecast about the forecast of
the others, increasing Va r[πD,t].
6C o n c l u s i o n
Costs to acquire and process information make its diﬀusion through the economy slow:
i.e., information is sticky. Likewise, heterogeneity in the sources and interpretation of new
information is likely to make relevant information about the economy dispersed across agents.
In this paper, we have considered the impact of sticky and dispersed information on individual
price setting decisions, and the resulting eﬀect on the aggregate price level and the inﬂation
rate.
Compared to a setting in which information is solely sticky as in Mankiw and Reis (2002),
sticky and dispersed information always leads to non-trivial eﬀects on prices regardless of
assumptions about the agents’ capability to predict equilibrium behavior by their opponents.
Moreover, the eﬀects of information on aggregate prices and inﬂation rates will be more
pronounced: aggregate prices and inﬂation rates will be more inertial than their sticky
information counterparts.
There are several interesting dimensions in which our model of price setting under SDI
can be extended. Perhaps the most important one is to explore the policy implications of
dispersed information. In a world in which information is dispersed, a benevolent central
banker’s optimal communication policy is far from trivial. On the one hand, any information
disclosed by the central banker about the state will have the beneﬁt of allowing the agents
to count on an additional piece of information about the state when deciding on their prices.
On the other hand, from a social perspective, agents will place too much weight on any
information disclosed by the central banker as this is a public signal (e.g., Morris and Shin
(2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007)). One can remedy this latter eﬀect by setting
a tax that corrects the incentives the agents have to "coordinate" on such public signal.
Our derivation of the equilibrium played by ﬁrms and the prevailing Phillips curve when
information is sticky and dispersed is a necessary ﬁrst step toward answering the policy
questions suggested above.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Prior Distribution
At this appendix, we calculate the distribution of the fundamental θt−j given that the ﬁrm
updated its information set at period t − j.W ec a nc o m p u t ef (θt−j | Θt−j−1,x t−j) as
26f (θt−j | θt−j−1,x t−j)=
f (θt−j,θ t−j−1,x t−j) R ∞
−∞ f (θt−j,θ t−j−1,x t−j)dθt−j
=
f (θt−j−1,x t−j | θt−j)f (θt−j) R ∞
−∞ f (θt−j,θ t−j−1,x t−j)dθt−j
=
f (θt−j−1 | θt−j)f (xt−j | θt−j)f (θt−j) R ∞
−∞ f (θt−j,θ t−j−1,x t−j)dθt−j
where the last equality holds due to the independence of ξt (z) and  t−j.A s
xt−j (z)=θt−j + ξt−j (z)
θt−j−1 = θt−j −  t−j.








and f (θt−j−1 | θt−j)=N (θt−j,α −1). If the dynamics of θt was








1 − ρ2 =
α−1
1 − ρ2.
Therefore, the distribution of θt−j would be given by f (θt−j)=N (0,Ψ−1) where Ψ =.α(1 − ρ2).
Thus, we would obtain
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μ =[ ∆xt−j (z)+( 1− ∆)zt−j−1] ∆ = β (β + α + Ψ)
−1
zt−j−1 = Λρθt−j−1 Λ = α(β + α)
−1
Σ2 =( β + α + Ψ)
−1
As ρ → 1,w eh a v eΨ → 0, ∆ → δ,a n dΣ2 → (β + α)
−1.T h u s f (θt−j | θt−j−1,x t−j)=
N (μ,σ2) where μ =[ δxt−j (z)+( 1− δ)θt−j−1],a n dσ2 =( β + α)
−1.
7.2 Higher Order Beliefs
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and the initial weights are (κ1,k,δ1,k) ≡ (1 − δ,δ).




















Λj [(1 − δ)xt−j (z)+δθt−j−1]dz
= λ
P∞
j=0 (1 − λ)
j [(1 − δ)θt−j + δθt−j−1].

















j=0 (1 − λ)
j E [(1 − δ)θt−j + δθt−j−1 | It−m(z)]dz.
We know that
E [θt−j | It−m (z)] =
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which is exactly our result.
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